Yet one of the modern world's most annoying intrusions is one of the oldest: the door-to-door salesman.

Unfortunately, these conversations are very hard for me to avoid. The way my house is set up, if someone is at my front door, they can see right into my living room where I spend 99% of my non-sleeping time. I could be reading. I could be making out with my dog, surfing the internet or watching TV. That's usually the killer because someone at the door is in a prime spot to see and hear the TV screen. So if I don't answer, they usually just keep ringing my doorbell which drives my dog crazy, which in turn drives me nuts. Then I have to answer, just to keep my dog from spontaneously combusting. Because if I am anything, it is a responsible dog owner.

You know you have a door-to-door salesman on your hands when at some point he utters the phrase, "I'm not a salesman." Like last week a guy dressed in corporate sales uniform - a polo shirt with logo so as not to seem too formal - informed me that he wasn't a salesman, he was a problem solver. And he wanted to solve my telephone, internet and cable television problems.

The salesman who knocks on my door selling 'No Solicitor' signs is going to make a killing. That's a problem I really, truly and honestly need solved. But before buying, I'd have to ask if these folks if they appreciated the beautiful irony of their situation.

Al mismo tiempo desde RedHat se han apresurado a lanzar un comunicado de seguridad, además de crear un script con el que se puede saber si hay paquetes comprometidos por esta intrusión.

From: "Paul W. Frields" <stickster@gmail.com>
To: fedora-announce-list <fedora-announce-list@redhat.com>
Subject: Infrastructure report, 2008-08-22 UTC 1200

Last week we discovered that some Fedora servers were illegally
accessed. The intrusion into the servers was quickly discovered,
and the servers were taken offline.

Security specialists and administrators have been working since
then to analyze the intrusion and the extent of the compromise
as well as reinstall Fedora systems. We are using the requisite
outages as an opportunity to do other upgrades for the sake of
functionality as well as security. Work is ongoing, so please
be patient. Anyone with pertinent information relating to this
event is asked to contact fedora-legal@redhat.com.

One of the compromised Fedora servers was a system used for
signing Fedora packages. However, based on our efforts, we have
high confidence that the intruder was not able to capture the
passphrase used to secure the Fedora package signing key. Based
on our review to date, the passphrase was not used during the
time of the intrusion on the system and the passphrase is not
stored on any of the Fedora servers.

While there is no definitive evidence that the Fedora key has
been compromised, because Fedora packages are distributed via
multiple third-party mirrors and repositories, we have decided
to convert to new Fedora signing keys. This may require
affirmative steps from every Fedora system owner or
administrator. We will widely and clearly communicate any such
steps to help users when available.

Among our other analyses, we have also done numerous checks of
the Fedora package collection, and a significant amount of
source verification as well, and have found no discrepancies
that would indicate any loss of package integrity. These
efforts have also not resulted in the discovery of additional
security vulnerabilities in packages provided by Fedora.

Our previous warnings against further package updates were based
on an abundance of caution, out of respect for our users. This is
also why we are proceeding with plans to change the Fedora package
signing key. We have already started planning and implementing other
additional safeguards for the future. At this time we are confident
there is little risk to Fedora users who wish to install or upgrade
signed Fedora packages.

In connection with these events, Red Hat, Inc. detected an intrusion
of certain of its computer systems and has issued a communication to
Red Hat Enterprise Linux users which can be found at
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2008-0855.html. This communication
states in part, "Last week Red Hat detected an intrusion on certain
of its computer systems and took immediate action. While the
investigation into the intrusion is on-going, our initial focus was
to review and test the distribution channel we use with our customers,
Red Hat Network (RHN) and its associated security measures. Based on
these efforts, we remain highly confident that our systems and
processes prevented the intrusion from compromising RHN or the
content distributed via RHN and accordingly believe that customers who
keep their systems updated using Red Hat Network are not at risk. We
are issuing this alert primarily for those who may obtain Red Hat
binary packages via channels other than those of official Red Hat
subscribers."

It is important to note that the effects of the intrusion on Fedora
and Red Hat are *not* the same. Accordingly, the Fedora package
signing key is not connected to, and is different from, the one used
to sign Red Hat Enterprise Linux packages. Furthermore, the Fedora
package signing key is also not connected to, and is different from,
the one used to sign community Extra Packages for Enterprise Linux
(EPEL) packages.

We will continue to keep the Fedora community notified of any
updates.

Thank you again for your patience.

CfH (who might get support from the BMA) might decide to go to a 'consent to view' model similar to the one used in Scotland even though this has been shown to be seriously flawed and there are still significant differences on what is shared and with whom..

So whats the problem?

The consent to view model does not solve problems, it can make them worse and hides the serious issue of SUS and others geting hold of patient data.

Doctors, nurses and even admin staff do not need the consent of a patient to view the records as it is up to the doctor and nurse to decide what they see and what others see (although in some places that decision is taken by just 1 doctor).

It is rather typical of the BMA to run away from the issue of SUS and others, such a the police, getting hold of the information. The consent to view model is typical of doctors, nurses and NHS managers who like to go on the idea that what the patient does not know will not hurt them. They also go on the idea that doctor/nurse knows best. It is a matter of fact (and this is supported by the GMC, Calldicott Gaurdians and the ICO) that a doctor/nurse can not only view information the patient has said they do not want them to see but the doctor/nurse can also withhold medical treatment if the patient says no. That means if you go along to an out of hours centre or A&E and say no to their request to view the record they can ether still access it or actually refuse to treat you.

Consent to view is a joke.

Further reading:

http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=23&storycode=4120259&c=2

http://www.ehiprimarycare.com/news/4012/implied_consent_set_to_be_scrapped_for_scr

I'm in the process of getting my homestudy updated.  Shouldn't be a big deal, as I'm using the same social worker, but I have to have a home visit nonetheless.  Aside from delivering to the agency documents pretty much describing most of the most intimate aspects of your life in detail, a social worker comes to visit your house.  The purpose of the home visit really is to see that your home would be a healthy/safe environment for the child you'd like to adopt.  That's what they tell you at least.  For some reason, though, I just cannot act as though this is true.  Most people seem to sweat the disclosure side of the homestudy - you know, when you have to disclose whether you've been arrested, had a substance-abuse problem, health issues, etc.  I don't have these issues, so instead of breezing through the process, I obsess about the home visit.

My social worker will be at my home in one week, and I have developed a homestudy cleaning plan in order to ensure my house is spotless by the time the SW arrives on Tuesday.  I will also be buying additional safety equipment (fire extinguishers) and enhancing my child-proofing.   An added bonus is that I was already scheduled to have two rooms painted and new light fixtures installed this weekend, so the house will be looking great.

What bothers me is that I know better.  Sure it's great to have a thoroughly cleaned house, and there's definitely a benefit to having additional safety features, but neither of these things are necessary for the homestudy update.  The problem here is that I'm allowing myself to fall onto the same obsessive path that I followed during my first adoption.  The path where I sweated each and every detail.  I'm afraid this does not bode well.

Although I am pleased there has been such a rulling I think it needs to ne looked at very carefully.

Paul Thormton mentions that it was about un-otherised access and about the nurse not having a role to play in the patients health care.

It should not be forgoten (and this is what makes this ruling less effective for those against the national database) the amount of aurthorised userers and ligitmimate access and use has been increasing over the years and doctors/nurses have refused to do anything about it (most have even been caausing the increase and have co-operated with those invading our privacy)). It is also up to GP practices (not individual GPs) who will have a legitimate need to access the data. This last ssue is also where the likes of TBOO and loads of doctors fall down and are shown to have double standards. If a nurse in an asthma clinic has a 'need to know' had an abortion, sexual problem, rape/abuse and everything ales in the patients record they can not then complain if a consultant at A&E were to access the same information especially where it is a matter of life or death.

It would also be hard to stand your ground and demand a receptionist at A&E should not have access to a patients record whilst at the same time allowing their own reception staff the same level of access.

I have been in practices where doctors can withhold medical treatment if the patient says no to data sharing, even if this causes harm or death to the patient or others. I think if GPs are allowed to do such things with the aproval/backing of the GMC, BMA, NHS, the ICO and Calldicott Gaurdians, it is hard, if not impossible, to say a consultant/nurse at the hospital can not do the same thing. If have been in practices where staff have accessed records without patient consent and as I found out from the ICO when complaining about Lancashier And South Cumbria Agencey in Preston, a patient has no right to stop access even where the person accessing the record has alterd an access request to gain access to the record.

You can jump for joy at this rulling if you want, but chances are you will hit the floor hard when reality sets in.

Other links about this story (soory they are so long):

http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2156%3Aechr-finds-finland-in-breach-of-patient-confidentiality&catid=33%3Ageneral&Itemid=158

http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=837925&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (full rulling)

As my friend and current flatmate Carla and I were enjoying some stir fry and a nice glass of red wine like 2 frumpy old ladies on a Friday night, a few unexpected visitors arrived. A recent flatmate, Mia, who had expressed her decision to stay on the other side of town not a few hours earlier, had spontaneously showed up, drunk as a peacock, loud as a barrister and loose as a goose, with 2 men at her side. (1 attractive 1 not, neither speaking very good English) 

I must say, though our night was going so sound without a hitch, I found it rather amusing to have this unexpected intrusion. Hardly able to hold a sentence by this time,  the extremely blonde, fake tanned Mia barged into the bathroom as I was brushing my teeth with half a shirt over her eyes, begging me to help her get it on straight. Bless her, she was putting on some sort of odd fashion show amongst her 2 suitors with the help of the illustrious Jack Daniels. Though they invited us to join, both Carla and I looked at each other and laughed, knowing perfectly well that Mia brought those men back to our place to carry on some very improper and scandalous 'mischevities.' (My new word) 

I bother writing about this because in retrospect, the entire incident made me contemplate whether or not this constitutes Mia as a floozy in my eyes. It wasn't as if this was done delicately and was both comical and tragic as it seemed like a desperate, rather shallow act. I suppose it was in the way it happened. But who am I to judge? 

Which brings me to my question. What I'd like to know from anyone who's reading is what exactly defines a 'floozy'?

Bellow are links to stories about how there are plans to increase the amount of people with access to our records. It is bad enough a patient cant tell their GP something without having to let every doctor and nurse they see at the practice know about it despite there usually not being a 'need to know' basis, It is bad enough reception staff are getting access to our records and knowing our test results and what medications we have been issued, now they want to social care, voluntry orgs, private firms, researchers and never ending list.

Will doctors defend the patient right to privacy? Dont bank on it!

http://www.ehiprimarycare.com/news/3915/access_to_nhs_care_records_may_be_widened

http://www.ehiprimarycare.com/news/3947/data_sharing_review_has_messages_for_the_nhs

Algorithms can be useful, but they don't provide you with the information on the real-time condition of your oil that you get from an oil condition monitor. With an oil condition monitor you are able to:

• Detect intrusion from water, coolant or fuel. Intrusion can lead to catastrophic engine failure - not to mention catastrophic repair bills.
• Compare oils (synthetic vs. conventional, Royal Purple vs. Mobil 1, etc.) and oil filters to determine which works best for your vehicle and application. We know some people are VERY brand loyal. Now you can prove it, or, perhaps be surprised by what you find out.
• Maximize performance  - drivers who are concerned about top performance want to know when their additive package is starting to deplete (much sooner than you'd expect) and want to keep their oil in the best condition possible.

If your vehicle uses an algorithm, you only have part of the picture. With an oil condition monitoring system you get the whole picture - in real time.

This is our first Episode, covering snort basics. Snort is a packet sniffer and a network intrusion detection blackbox. It performs protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and is commonly used to actively block or passively detect a variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, web application attacks, SMB probes, and OS fingerprinting attempts, amongst other features. The software is mostly used for intrusion prevention purposes, by dropping attacks as they are taking place. In this video cast we will see that how un-encrypted data, sent over a network can be easily sniffed/detected using snort. Thus never ever send important data like PINs, passwords, checkout codes, un-encrypted over the internet.

NOTE: You May Require to install a QuickTime plugin. To watch the web-based flash version of this episode click http://blip.tv/file/1034721

[blip.tv ?posts_id=1040992&dest=-1]

Episode 1- Sniffing Packets using Snort - Basics

Comments, Queries and Feedback most welcome!!

Watchout for Episode 2. You can also leave texts abt topics liked by you to be covered in the comments section :-)Linux users may see this to setup flash on theri firefox browsers.

Pervasive security cameras don’t substantially reduce crime. There are exceptions, of course, and that’s what gets the press. Most famously, CCTV cameras helped catch James Bulger’s murderers in 1993. And earlier this year, they helped convict Steve Wright of murdering five women in the Ipswich area. But these are the well-publicised exceptions. Overall, CCTV cameras aren’t very effective.

This fact has been demonstrated again and again: by a comprehensive study for the Home Office in 2005, by several studies in the US, and again with new data announced last month by New Scotland Yard. They actually solve very few crimes, and their deterrent effect is minimal.

Conventional wisdom predicts the opposite. But if that were true, then camera-happy London, with something like 500,000, would be the safest city on the planet. It isn’t, of course, because of technological limitations of cameras, organisational limitations of police and the adaptive abilities of criminals.

Read article

Curiosamente nos pasó casi a la vez que a uno de nuestros blogs-amigos Mazagón Beach, su intrusión fue más grave y supuso el bloqueo de su cuenta de administrador durante algunos días, y el hacker llegó incluso a borrar varias galerías fotográficas que no mostraban, precisamente, las imágenes más hermosas de Mazagón.

Nosotros como ellos nos sentimos indignados por este tipo de hechos que no sólo suponen una vulneración de la ley sino que también un atentado contra la libertad de expresión.

Email : alfi_qiux@yahoo.com

http://www.snort.org/docs/snort_manual/node16.html

http://www.howtoforge.com/intrusion-detection-with-snort-mysql-apache2-on-ubuntu-7.10

http://www.howtoforge.com/intrusion_detection_base_snort

http://www.howtoforge.com/intrusion_detection_snort_base_postgresql_ubuntu6.06

For years, companies big and small, spend whopping amounts of moolah just to keep their systems safe from intrusion. I should know because that’s what I help prevent daily from 9 to 5. This urge to isolate essential data has been the response to today's edge in every business.. Information, hiding and sharing portions of it thereof, dictates the rise and fall of any established system, may it be accounting, learning firms, documentation of newly developed technology or even a simple lists of contacts of people, name it. Every drop of leaked information may seem negligible for the source’s standpoint, but damn, how priceless would it be if a competing entity grabs a hold of it.

The "hole" that leaked the drop is discovered. "Exploitation of a flaw" has its own field of art. Like sharks agitated by the smell of even just a drop of blood, competition would crave to wanting more, until all there is left are bones and scavenged flesh.

On technical jargon, most of this "blood draining" happens on system entry and exit points called "ports". Although there are other means, ports are basically the super obvious targets for attackers (eavesdroppers are of a safer species), these are where most of the data communication actions come to play. There are many, and all ports are numbered (port 20 is for FTP, port 80 is for HTTP etc.).There is an option however to just shut it all down, but what good is a system if its not connected to anything (duuhhh).

Systems cannot afford to disconnect itself from the world, doing so will make itself useless, just a pile of very expensive paperweight. On the other hand, it can and will be exposed to vulnerabilities if it communicates with other systems. Simply "belonging" to a network group or even being under a host server will require it to spill out at least some information about itself, and what it holds, and a part of what it can do sooner or later. Like some social groups are to people, networks require a piece of that connecting system, or an operation that it can perform, before it could really be integrated into the circle.

It’s basically a matter of which ports are to be left open, and which ones should be disabled. Even the safest of ports would fall on its knees if attacked using the right technique. That's why administrators and businesses have been paranoid to what could and could not happen, information passing through is quadruple checked even if it involves unnecessary data. Costly protection schemes and devices are implemented at a whim, as restoration is impossible if attacks are carried out in just seconds. Outside threat or inside job, anyone can attack you.

There is no real fail-safe mechanism. Survival depends on seeing catastrophe before it happen. Intuition, doubts, and instinct, paranoia is indeed a great factor.

Now, what does that leave us with? Is information technology eventually gearing towards the spectrum of social engineering? Or are we just paranoid about it, too much that we treat situations happening around us as extensions of our subconscious minds.

Where are you right now?

Who have you been talking to?

What have you been saying?

Acceptance is not universal, nor it is absolute. All there is..is the truth that you are vulnerable. As the ironic saying goes, if you keep treating yourself as a loner, no one would care, because no one would know until you let them see that you are. That's why no man is an island. It's the risk that comes with communicating.

Which of your ports are open?

Le e-Marketing dispose de plus en plus d’outils performants pour collecter et analyser les données sur les consommateurs qui commencent à s’inquiéter quant à l’usage de leurs infos personnelles. Comment les toucher sans les brusquer ?

A retenir:

• Près de trois personnes interrogées sur quatre se disent dérangées par le fait qu'une entreprise puisse stocker des informations les concernant.
• Le Web reste souvent un canal propice aux bonnes affaires, sur lequel l'influence des marques est parfois secondaire
• Les sites de marques ou d'enseignes occupent la seconde place des outils les plus prescripteurs, après la carte de fidélité
• Les internautes préfèrent recevoir des informations par voie de messagerie électronique en provenance de leurs marques et enseignes préférées plutôt que par voie postale ou SMS.

Source JDN:

http://www.journaldunet.com/ebusiness/marques-sites/analyse/ce-que-les-consommateurs-attendent-des-marques/ce-que-les-consommateurs-attendent-des-marques.shtml

Introducción

El aumento y la gravedad de los ataques hoy en día hacen que los sistemas de detección de intrusos sean una parte indispensable de la seguridad.

Las empresas tienen buenas razones comerciales y legales para establecer sólidas políticas de seguridad. Después de todo, su existencia depende de dichas políticas. Sin embargo, la empresa que no controle el abuso de estas políticas perderá un importante componente de seguridad. Si no implementan ningún control, los ejecutivos nunca sabrán si se cumplen sus políticas de seguridad. Por esta razón, es esencial instalar un Sistema de Detección de Intrusos (IDS).

Este artículo discute las razones para invertir en un Sistema de detección de intrusos (IDS) y los aspectos clave que deben tener en cuenta las empresas cuando evalúen un sistema.

¿Para qué invertir en un sistema de detección de intrusos?

El aumento y la gravedad de los ataques hoy en día hace que los sistemas de detección de intrusos sean una parte indispensable de la seguridad. En efecto, cualquier empresa que no esté buscando ser objeto de un intento de los intrusos, no tiene idea acerca de cuáles son las amenazas que están allí. Una vez implementado, el sistema IDS reportará las amenazas que pueden respaldar las sospechas de que la red de la compañía está siendo atacada. Además, entender la frecuencia y los tipos de ataques le permite a la organización determinar los controles de seguridad que se deben adoptar.

El sistema IDS también simplifica la tarea de verificar y categorizar las amenazas en los informes que se presentan a la administración ejecutiva. Esta información sólida ayuda a la dirección a aceptar la administración de la seguridad adicional.

Aspectos importantes que hay que tener en cuenta

Las empresas algunas veces invierten en un sistema de detección de intrusos IDS que es difícil de soportar, que reporta demasiados falsos positivos (ataques aparentes generados por actividades legítimas) y que no puede responder a la velocidad de la red. Para reducir las posibilidades de que suceda esto, las empresas deben tener en cuenta los siguientes criterios cuando evalúen un sistema de detección de intrusos IDS.

Respuesta: Un Sistema de detección de intrusos IDS debe ir más allá de la simple notificación proporcionando respuestas automatizadas basadas en políticas para proteger los sistemas y ofreciendo tiempo y tranquilidad al personal de seguridad. Cuando es necesario localizar el origen de un ataque (frecuentemente se ataca con una dirección falsificada), el enfoque tradicional ha sido interrogar manualmente a los routers y encontrar el flujo relevante de los datos. Este es un ejercicio agotador que puede llevar muchas horas o días, incluso para un ingeniero de redes experimentado. Una empresa debe a cambio escoger un IDS que pueda rastrear los ataques rápida y automáticamente, incluso aquellos que son falsificados o que se reflejan, de regreso al punto de ingreso de la red. Esto permitirá a la empresa reaccionar rápida y eficientemente para bloquear los ataques de negación de servicio que pueden afectar la disponibilidad del ancho de banda y del servicio.

Instalación: Un sistema IDS debería poder manejar los escenarios de instalación más grandes y exigentes, incluso el monitoreo de los múltiples segmentos de la red. También debería ser capaz de proteger las infraestructuras de la información empresarial mediante la detección de múltiples gigabits de alta velocidad.

Análisis: Un sistema IDS debería tener un motor de análisis y correlación que analizase los numerosos eventos que suceden en la red y los evaluase en contexto. El tiempo y el conocimiento son críticos para lanzar una respuesta rápida y efectiva a los ataques contra los activos empresariales de misión crítica en el momento en que se produzcan. La acumulación de eventos en tiempo real, la correlación y el análisis pueden reducir dramáticamente el esfuerzo que tradicionalmente se exige del personal de seguridad para darle tiempo a que realice un trabajo investigativo sobre los sofisticados intrusos y las políticas en lugar de pasar horas examinando los registros de eventos no correlacionados.

Facilidad de administración: Un sistema IDS debe recoger los datos importantes de detección directamente de los conmutadores de redes, lo que reduce la cantidad de sensores que se necesita instalar y administrar en toda la red a fin de reducir el Costo Total de Propiedad (TCO).

Costo de expansión: Muchas empresas no se dan cuenta de que la ampliación de los sistemas IDS diseñados específicamente para redes conmutadas de alta velocidad cuestan menos que la de los sistemas tradicionales. Una instalación tradicional requiere de un sensor para cada segmento de la red, además del costo del hardware, software y de la administración del sistema. Cuando una compañía necesita expandirse para tener cobertura de red total, los costos asociados al financiamiento de los sensores, hardware, software y administración del sistema serán comparables a los costos de aquellos componentes de la instalación inicial. Por el contrario, un sistema IDS diseñado para funcionar en redes conmutadas de alta velocidad permite una cobertura máxima sin el costo agregado de la administración del sistema. Un sistema IDS con la herramienta de localización puede compararse a un grupo de cámaras de seguridad almacenadas convenientemente. Sin embargo, a diferencia de las cámaras de seguridad, el sistema IDS debe tener la inteligencia para saber que ha ocurrido un incidente, para continuar recogiendo datos y alertar al administrador del sistema. Con este tipo de sistema IDS, los ahorros empresariales sólo en concepto de soporte, instalación y mantenimiento pueden ser significativos.

Conclusiones

Las empresas que no han invertido aún en un software de detección de intrusos, deben hacerlo. Aplazar esta inversión supone para la empresa un riesgo no únicamente de modificación, destrucción y robo de la información, sino de ser objeto de demandas legales. El sistema IDS que la empresa adopte en ultima instancia, debe proporcionar un método muy bien coordinado para administrar los asuntos de seguridad, desde la identificación de robos en la red y recogida de información adicional solicitada, hasta responder rápidamente y tomar las medidas adecuadas.

Your tax dollars at work invading your person:

1.  Illegal search....why?  No probable cause.

2.  Perverts will certainly get their jollies off of this.

Mejoras no oficiales por troyanosyvirus.com.ar:
-Mejoras en la ocultacion:
Indetectable a algunos antivirus y a todos los antivirus desactualizados hace unos meses.
Mejorado el sistema de salteo de firewall.

-Mejoras en la gestion de archivos:
Agregado gestor de descargas, permite cancelar, pausar, mover arriba, abajo, etc.
Aumentada la velocidad y estabilidad de las descargas.
Guarda datos en cache.
Permite ver vistas en miniaturas en imagenes jpg.
Agregada opcion para disminuir la velocidad de descarga asi se aumenta el ancho de banda.
Agregada opcion para reproducir sonidos con volumen maximo y por defecto.
Agregada vista "Treeview"

-Otras mejoras
El server corre en windows vista 64 bits, aunque el keylogger todabia sigue sin funcionar en este SO.
Agregada captura del clipboard en el keylogger.
Mejorada la estabilidad en el metodo de inicio activex.
Nueva columna en el cliente que muestra la ventana activa en cada victima.
Los datos de antivirus y firewall se extraen del centro de seguridad de windows.
Agregada funcion para captura de password de firefox 2.

Descarga:
Bifrost 1.2d (mediafire)
Bifrost 1.2d (rapidshare)

On dira ce qu'on veut de la puissance des technologies modernes, moi je continue à penser qu'elles vont beaucoup trop loin et mettent en péril notre vie privée. Par exemple là, je voulais voir ce qui se passait si je tapais mon adresse sur Google Maps. J'ai zoomé sur le quartier, et puis zoomé encore sur la rue et puis encore zoomé ... et j'ai presque pu lire le livre que je tenais à la fenêtre ! Alors là je dis stop car trop c'est trop : un outil aussi précis peut même devenir dangereux dans les mains de cinglés.

Les livreurs de pizza vont pouvoir délivrer leurs missiles avec plus de précision
Le bateau in memoriam sur Google Maps